Some differences in corporate governance in Germany, Japan, and America
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Some differences in corporate governance in Germany, Japan, and America

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Published by Columbia University School of Law in New York .
Written in English


  • Corporate governance -- Germany.,
  • Corporate governance -- Japan.,
  • Corporate governance -- United States.

Book details:

Edition Notes

Includes bibliographical references.

StatementMark J. Roe.
SeriesWorking paper / Columbia University School of Law, Center for Law and Economic Studies -- #86, Working paper (Columbia University. Center for Law and Economic Studies) -- no. 86.
ContributionsColumbia University. Center for Law and Economic Studies.
The Physical Object
Pagination56, [14] p. ;
Number of Pages56
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL16402045M

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The critical distinction between the American model of corporate governance and the German and Japanese models is that in Germany and Japan large-block shareholders take an active management role to mitigate managerial shirking and misconduct. German and Japanese commercial banks are at the center of their respective corporate governance models. Much of this attention has focused on differences between the US system and those of its strongest industrial competitors, Germany and Japan. The US corporate governance system is generally characterized as a market-based system. US capital markets are liquid and company ownership is relatively by: 8. We would like to show you a description here but the site won’t allow more.   This case examines the structure of corporate governance in three economies: Germany, Japan, and the United States. It presents the structure and background on the composition of corporate boards of directors and examines how corporate governance impacts on managerial decisions. Excerpt. UVA-F Rev. Cited by: 1.

Abstract. The Japanese corporate governance system underwent drastic changes since the last two or three decades. Prior to the country’s financial meltdown in the s, Japan’s corporate governance model was praised by many as a model worthy of imitation around the world. executive, instrumental, and monitoring Therefore, it seems that there are. at least two possible options for establishing corporate governance structure: one is to have a unitary board to perform all these functions, or the other is. to divide the board and have different directors Cited by: 2. COMPARING JAPANESE VERSUS U.S. DECISION MAKING IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE Waning investor confidence in the performance of Japanese corporations has motivated some Japanese firms to embrace corporate governance structures and practices that resemble U.S. board reforms. Western-style CEOs, like Howard Stringer at Sony or Carlos Ghosn at Nis-.   The Japanese Model. The Japanese model is the outlier of the three. Governance patterns take shape in light of two dominant legal relationships: one between shareholders, .

Superficially, to submit a shareholder proposal in the United States, you only need to have held, continuously for one year, either 1 percent of the company’s shares, or stock with a market value of $2, In Japan, the hurdle is also not very high. You are required to hold, for six months or more. Abstract. This study examines how widespread the similarities between US and Japanese corporate governance practices have become. Results suggest that, in spite of convergence in many areas of business practices, Japanese board structures and governance practices still differ greatly from those in the United States—particularly in Securities and Exchange Commission-mandated reforms such as Cited by: 6. The differences in the board systems of Germany and Japan are naturally a result of the different levels of state intervention between German corporate governance and their Japanese counterparts. German companies are largely influenced by the state by means of legal regulation (Jackson ).   This paper attempts to shed light on these issues by describing in detail the important characteristics of the corporate control mechanisms in large non-financial firms in the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and Germany by examining why such differences exist and by comparing some of the strengths and weaknesses of each by: